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soldiers killed in action are permitted to marry their dead sweethearts
by complying with statutory registration proceedings. This type of
legislation is designed to legitimize children and facilitate widows'
pensions. While marriage by proxy is not permitted in Germany,
French war prisoners interned in prison camps in Germany and in
29
occupied France may marry their fianc6es at home by proxy.
By purely logical reasoning, the validity of proxy marriages in
America might be upheld (1) where the marriage is by consentual
contract in states which recognize common law marriage, the contract
being one in which the parties mutually agree in the present tense
to assume the relation of man and wife, and (2) where the marriage
is by statutory solemnization in states where the statutory provisions
do not expressly require the personal presence of the parties.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PARKING METER ORDINANCE
Appellants, owners of business property in the city of Marion,
appealed from the superior court, contesting the constitutionality of
a parking meter ordinance adopted by the city.' Held, that the ordinance did not deprive the appellants of their property without due
process of law, and that it was a reasonable exercise of the police
power. Andrews et al. v. City of Marion et al.,
- Ind. , 47
N.E. (2d) 968 (1943).
The city had no specific statutory authority to enact such an
ordinance, 2 but in upholding the ordinance the court relied on the
general statutory authority delegated to the municipalities for the
regulation and control of traffic.3
As members of the general public the appellants have a right
of free and unobstructed passage of the streets, subject of course
to reasonable regulation. 4 This common law right, however, does not
include parking, which is a privilege and may be taken away entirely. 5
29.

N. Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1941, p. 14, col. 3. (Wired from Paris via
Berlin).
1. In order to alleviate the difficulties caused by parking for long
periods of time, the ordinance authorized the use of parking
meters in the more congested parts of the business streets of the
city.
2. Apparently, only New York has granted specific statutory authority to municipalities. People v. Baxter, 32 N.Y.S. (2d) 320
(1941); Gilsey Building Inc. v. Incorporated Village of Great
Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 694 (1939), aff'd,
16 N.Y.S. (2d) 832 (2d Dep't 1939).
3. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933) §§47-1827, 47-1828, 48-1407.
4. Teague v. City of Bloomington, 40 Ind. App. 68, 81 N.E. 103
(1907); State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185 (1880); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Quincy, 136 Ill. 563, 27 N.E. 182 (1891).
And see Dillon, "Municipal Corporations" (5th ed. 1911) §1163.
5. Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P. (2d) 1015 (1937); Village
of Wonenoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W. 755 (1930); In
City of Chicago v. McKinley, 344 Ill. 297, 304, 176 N.E. 261, 264
(1931), the court said, "The traveler on the street has no abso-
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However, the appellants have rights more extensive than members of the general public, since they are abutting land owners and
own title to the property on which the parking meters have been
placed, subject to the public's perpetual easement.8
This additional
right is the right of the abutting owners' ingress and egress to their
7
property.
These rights were first definitely recognized in the Elevated Railroad cases, but in those cases there was no direct conflict with the
power of the municipality.8 Modern decisions have announced that
the public interest is superior to the property interest of the abutting
owner, and have consistently held that the rights of the abutting
owners are subject to reasonable regulation and control under the
police power.0 A great majority of cases have further held that
lute right to have his vehicle standing on the street while he
goes into a neighboring building to transact business . .

.

"

Willis, "Constitutional Law" (1936) 748: "The free use of the
street does not include the privilege of parking automobiles on
the street."
6. At common law, dedication of land for a public roadway left
title in the abutting owner, and this view prevails generally
today. Clark v. City of Huntington, 74 Ind. App. 437, 127 N.E.
301, 128 N.E. 453 (1920); Town of Freedom v. Norris, 128 Ind.
377, 27 N.E. 869 (1891); McQuillin, "Municipal Corporations"
(2d ed. 1928) No. 1409; see also Swain v. City of Indianapolis,
202 Ind. 242, 246, n. 1, 171 N.E. 871, 876, n. 1 (1930).
Yet
there is no substantial difference as to the question at hand,
whether title is in the abutting owner and relief is sought in
ejectment or trespass; or the title is held in trust by the city and
relief is sought through an action for breach of trust. White v.'
Northwestern N.C.R., 113 N.C. 610, 18 S.E. 330 (1893); Lewis,
"Eminent Domain" (3rd ed. 1909) §128; cf. Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876). But of prime importance is the fact that the public
use of land dedicated for a street is not limited by the use prevailing at the time of dedication but may be enlarged to include
modern methods of enjoyment. Magee v. Overshiner, 150 Ind. 127,
49 N.E. 951 (1898).
7. Instant case at 971. For cases recognizing this right, see Swain
v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind. 233, 242, 171 N.E. 871, 875 (1930);
O'Brien v. Central Iron & Steel Co., 158 Ind. 218, 222, 63 N.E. 302,
303 (1902); Dantzer v. Indianapolis Union R., 141 Ind. 604,
39 N.E. 233 (1894); Indiana B&W Ry. v. Eberle, 110 Ind. 542,
11 N.E. 467 (1887).
8. Story v. New York Elev. Ry., 90 N.Y. 122 (1882); Lohr v. Metropolitan Elev. Ry., 104 N.Y. 268, 10 N.E. 528 (1881).
The interference here was not on the part of the municipality in the
exercise of its police power but by a private party. Later,
where the interference was under the municipalities' police power,
the New York court held that the abutting owner's rights were
subject to reasonable regulation. Sauer v. Nevr York, 180 N.Y.
27, 72 N.E. 579 (1904), aff'd, 206 U.S. 536 (1906).
9. Foster's, Inc., et al .v. Boise City et al., Idaho , 118
P. (2d) 721 (1941); State v. Burkett, 119 Md. 609, 87 Atl. 514
(1913); Kimmel v. City of Spokane, 7 Wash. (2d) 372, 109 P.
(2d) 1069 (1941); see Swain v. City of Indianapolis, 202 Ind.
233, 242, 171 N.E. 871, 875 (1930). In Peck v. Olsen Constr. Co.,
216 Iowa 519, 527, 245 N.W. 131, 135 (1930), the plaintiff contended that since his right of ingress and egress was property,
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parking meters are a reasonable regulation and do not, as appellants
contend, deprive the abutting owner of his property without due process of law.1
Yet the Indiana court does not go this far, but further strengthens its case by interpreting the word "parking" in the ordinance as
meaning not interfering with the abutting owner's right to load and
unload passengers and merchandise.11 By so interpreting the statute,
the court avoids the slightly more difficult question of a temporary
stopping for no other reason than immediate access to the abutter's
property. It would seem, however, that this interest is also subject
to reasonable regulation. 1
Since the municipality's power in the instant case is confined
to regulation under the police power, the further question is presented: is this a revenue measure and thus not within the municipal
authority? 1" Several states have held this to be a sufficient reason
alone for invalidating parking meter ordinances. 14 Indiana, however,
correctly holds that if the primary purpose in imposing the charge
is to regulate, the charge is not a tax even if it produces revenue for
the public. 15 This holding, plus the fact that the evidence did not
show any substantial excess in the amount collected over the amount
necessary to pay the costs and expenses of enforcement,16 substantially negate the contention that this is a revenue measure.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

it couldn't be taken even for a public use without just compensation. The court, in pointing out the fallacy of this argument,
said, "One right may be subordinate and one paramount ...
To say, therefore, that this right to access is property, furnishes
no reason for saying that it cannot be subordinate to any paramount right." Cf. Eubank v. Yellow Cab Co., 84 Ind. 144, 149 N.E.
647 (1925), where the court granted an injunction against certain
cab stands because they interfered with the abutting owner's
right of access.
Foster's, Inc., v. Boise City, Idaho , 118 P. (2d) 721
(1941); City of Louisville v. Louisville Automobile Club, 290 Ky.
241, 160 S.W. (2d) 663 (1942); Gilsey Building, Inc., v. Incorporated Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S.
(2d) 694 (1939), aff'd, 16 N.Y.S. (2d) 832 (2d Dep't 1939);
Ex parte Harrison, 135 Tex. Cr. App. 611, 122 S.W. (2d) 314
(1938); County Court of Webster County v. Roman, 121 W. Va.
381, 3 S.E. (2d) 631 (1939). Alabama is the lone state holding
parking to be an incident to the abutting owners' right to ingress
and egress. City of Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co.,
233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114, 108 A.L.R. 1140 (1937).
Instant case at 971. For similar interpolations of the word "parking," see Village of Wonenoc v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W.
755 (1930); American Co. of Arkansas v. Baker, 187 Ark. 492,
60 S.W. (2d) 572 (1933).
See note 9 supra.
See note 3 supra.
M. R. Rodes, Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 217 N.C. 627, 9 S.E. (2d)
389 (1940); In re Opinion to the House of Representatives, 62
R.I. 347, 5A. (2d) 455 (1939); City of Shreveport v. Brister,
194 La. 615, 194 So. 566 (1940); Monsour v. City of Shreveport,
194 La. 625, 194 So. 569 (1940).
Schmidt v. City of Indianapolis, 168 Ind. 631, 80 N.E. 632, 14
L.R.A. (N.S.) 787, 120 Am. St. Rep. 385 (1907).
Instant case at 971.

